Domestic origination to international termination country set logic

ABSTRACT

A method and device for preventing fraud in international calls in a long-distance telecommunications system, where selected customers can avoid fraud control blocks and greater granularity is achieved in blocking international destinations. In the method and device, an override flag is created in the records of the Billing Number Screening (BNS) database. When a call is made using a billing number whose corresponding record has the override flag set, the call is not stopped by fraud control blocks on certain international destinations. In addition, international destinations can be blocked with greater specificity because a Country Set Logic (CSET) field is added to the International City Code Database. The addition of CSET to this database allows particular international city destinations to be blocked from certain origin points.

[0001] This application is a continuation of U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 09/859,296, filed May 17, 2001, entitled “DOMESTIC ORIGINATIONTO INTERNATIONAL TERMINATION COUNTRY SET LOGIC”, which has a commonassignee and inventorship to the present application, and the abovenoted patent application, is incorporated by reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

[0002] 1. Technological Field

[0003] The present application relates generally to fraud control intelecommunications systems and, in particular, to preventing fraud incalls from a domestic origin point to an international terminating pointin a long distance telecommunications network.

[0004] 2. Description of the Related Art

[0005] The telecommunications industry has experienced significantchanges in the way that customers are billed for their telephone calls.From the once simple method of billing the originating caller, manymethods have been developed, allowing greater flexibility for thetelecommunications customer. A predominant method for making telephonecalls away from home or the office is by utilizing the telephone callingcard to charge the call.

[0006] Calling card customers may use any telephone facility, includingpublic facilities, to make a call that will be charged to their account.The process of making calls using a calling card typically includesdialing an “800” number, waiting for an audio prompt, and then enteringan account number and a Personal Identification Number (PIN) into atelephone key pad device. The “800” (and now “888”) number phone callsare one type of a category of phone calls called “special service”calls. These special service calls, which include “700”, “800/888”, and“900” number calls, allow contemporary telecommunications networks toprovide many services beyond direct distance dialing. It is the longdistance carriers that provide this special service call processing,which allows for toll-free calls, calling card calls, special ratecalls, etc.

[0007] Following the example of a calling card call, once the accountnumber and PIN have been entered, the calling card customer can make oneor more calls from whatever location the customer is dialing in from.These calls are subsequently charged to the customer's calling cardaccount. Calling cards can also be used to avoid having to payadditional surcharges when making calls from certain public facilitiessuch as hotels and telephone booths.

[0008] As with many new technologies, the ease and flexibility of theuse of calling cards has led to abuse, and has consequently broughtabout new types of fraud. Calling card fraud costs businesses (andconsumers) millions of dollars annually. Current security mechanisms,while effective, are not fail-safe, and protection mechanisms forconsumers and businesses require improvement to stem these fraud-relatedlosses.

[0009] There is a virtual underground industry in stolen calling cardsand authorization codes. The multitude of ways that calling cards andauthorization numbers find their way into unscrupulous hands need not bediscussed here, but suffice it to say there is no end to the ingenuityof the criminal mind. One example of calling card fraud is the techniqueof “surfing” banks of public telephones, such as are at airports.Criminals “surf” by looking over the shoulders of legitimate card usersas they key in the account number and PIN. Then they sell or distributethese numbers and rampant fraud results. In some cases, a single accountmay incur charges in excess of $100,000 in a single weekend. Callingcard fraud and other forms of fraudulent use present pervasive problemsfor telephone carriers, particularly long distance carriers.

[0010] One method of fraud control is to simply remove calling cardnumbers against which it is suspected that fraudulent calls are beingcharged. In order to recognize fraudulent calls, a “billing number”—abilling product and an account number, such as a calling card, pre-paidphone card, etc.—is monitored over time. For example, where the numberof domestic calls placed within a certain amount of time using the samebilling number exceeds a certain threshold, an alert is generated.International calls may have a lower threshold so that fewer callswithin the time period generate an alert. In addition, the threshold maybe further adjusted for calls to countries where a high percentage offraudulent calls are directed.

[0011] Another method of fraud control is to identify particular originpoints that are linked to suspicious activity and to block certain callsfrom those particular origin points. For example, a large number of longduration calls to China may be generated from an exchange in Manhattan.This would generate a threshold alert, which is typically sent to afraud analyst. A fraud analyst would be stationed at a fraud controlconsole 100, as shown in FIG. 1. The fraud analyst analyzes the alertand the history of that exchange in order to determine whether or not toblock that exchange from calling China. If the fraud analyst decidesthat there is fraudulent activity, he sets up a block on that exchangewhich will prevent subsequent calls to China or other internationaldestinations that the fraud analyst selects.

[0012] The present invention concerns this type of blockage and, inparticular, blocks on special service calls that originate domesticallyand terminate internationally. An example of this type of specialservice call is shown with reference to FIG. 1. The caller, usingtelephone 111, makes a calling card call by dialing a number in theformat of 1NPA-NXX-XXXX. NPA stands for Number Plan Area, often referredto as the “area code”, which defines the geographic region of thenumber; NXX is the terminating exchange, typically identifying a switchwithin the geographic region; and XXXX is the unique stationdesignation. For most calling cards, the number will take the form1-800-NXX-XXXX, where the “800” signifies that the call is a specialservice call, rather than a geographic region. The call is routedthrough Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) 120. LEC refers to local telephonecompanies, such as the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), whichprovide local transmission services for their customers. Because of the1-800 format of the dialed number, the routers in the LEC will forwardthe call to the network of the appropriate long distance carrier (orInter-Exchange Carrier IXC) 130. Special service telephone calls, suchas “800” number calls, are provided by IXCs, such as MCI-Worldcom.

[0013] Returning to our call, after switching through LEC switches 122and 124, the “800” number is routed from POP (Point-of-Presence) switch125 into the IXC 130, and then through IXC switches 131 and 136, to abridge switch 135. The purpose of the bridge switch 135 is to receivecalls from the IXC network and bridge them to the Automatic CallDistributor (ACD) 140 and, ultimately, into the Intelligent ServicesNetwork platform (ISN) 150. Because special service calls requirespecial call processing, they are typically routed to a call processingplatform, such as the ISN platform 150. There are a number of ISNswithin the IXC, but, for the purpose of understanding the presentinvention, one ISN will suffice.

[0014] An exemplary and simplified diagram of the ISN platform 150 willnow be described with reference to FIG. 2. The ACD 140 is under thedirect control of the Application Processor APP 156, which is a generalpurpose computer that functions as the central point for call routingcontrol in the ISN 150. When the “800” number call arrives at the ACD140, the ACD 140 makes a request to the APP 156 for directions as to howthe call should be handled. Such a request would usually be accompaniedby information concerning the call; i.e. the Automatic Number Identifier(ANI) of the caller and the destination number of the call. The APP 156would recognize by the “800” prefix of the destination number that thecall is a special services call and, consequently, the APP 156 wouldinstruct the ACD 140 to deliver the call to the appropriate queue. Inthis case, assuming that the call is to a calling card “800” number, thecall would queue up to the Automatic Response Unit (ARU) 152. The ARU152 comprises two components, one to process the call, the other toprompt the caller with a voice response system. It is the ARU 152 thatwill ask the caller for the required final destination number, callingcard number, and PIN. When a live operator is required, the call isrouted to the Manual Telecommunications Operator Console (MTOC) 154.Whether the call is routed to the ARU 152 or the MTOC 154, the sameinformational decisions will have to be made. In other words, regardlessof whether it is entered by the operator at the MTOC 154 or by thecaller at her telephone 111 to the ARU 152, items such as the callingcard account number will have to be entered.

[0015] During the course of servicing a call, the need often arises to“park” a call on the ACD 140. When a call is parked on the ACD 140, thecall is active, i.e., there is a party on the call with an establishedvoice channel connected to the ACD 140. The call is monitored andmaintained at the ACD. Once a call is parked at the ACD, it is no longerunder direct control of either the ARU 152 or the MTOC 154 that parkedthe call. This allows the facilities at the ISN 150 to be freed up toperform other tasks or services. When call processing is completed, andthe call is authorized and validated, the call is released from the ACD140 and the bridge switch 135 to the automated switching of the IXCnetwork 130. As shown on FIG. 1, the call is then connected through IXCswitch 137 to a telephone 199 in China.

[0016] Now, a simplified and exemplary call processing procedure will bedescribed with reference to FIGS. 2, 3A, and 3B. Many steps that arerequired for call processing have been eliminated from the descriptionas unnecessary for the understanding of Country Set Logic. Assuming thatthe special services call is a calling card call from a domestic originto an international destination, the caller needs to enter her accountnumber, PIN, and the terminating ANI. It is assumed that all of thisdata is input before the procedure begins, but, as one skilled in therelevant art would know, some of the data could just as well be enteredduring the procedure. Following this example, once input is complete,the access code is looked up in an access-level database, such as theAuthorization Property Database (AUTH PROP) 168, at step 300 in FIG. 3A.The access code is the original 1-800-NXX-XXXX dialed in to accessspecial services, and an access-level database is a database keyed tothe various access codes.

[0017] Records in the Authorization Property Database 168 containvarious items keyed to the access code, including operator scripts,billing products, and options. The AUTH PROP records also contain afield for Country Set Logic in order to indicate limitations oninternational destinations. Basically, Country Set Logic consists ofthis extra field where a term in the form CSETX (where X represents anumber from 1 to 999) can be placed. For example, the access code“1-800-555-6543” might contain “CSET16” in its Country Set field (CSET).This means that, when the destination number is looked up in theinternational database, if the term “CSET16” appears in theinternational database, the call will be blocked. In step 305 of FIG.3A, it is determined whether there is an accesss-level CSET term in theAUTH PROP 168. If there is, the CSET term is saved in step 307. Ifeither there is no CSET term in step 305, or after the CSET term isstored in step 307, the call processing continues at step 310.

[0018] At step 310, the billing number associated with the customeraccount is looked up in the Billed Number Screening (BNS) database 160.The BNS contains records keyed by billing numbers and has flags toindicate various limitations on particular billing numbers. It isdetermined whether the billing number is flagged in step 315. If thebilling number is flagged, the call may be re-routed to an MTOC 154, afraud analyst at a fraud console 100, or simply disconnected. If thebilling number is not flagged in step 315, the exchange of theoriginating ANI (the prefix NPA-NXX of the originating number) is lookedup in an exchange-level database, such as the Exchange Master (X-MASTER)database 162, in step 320. The X-MASTER has records keyed on the variousNPA-NXXs and also includes flags that indicate various limitations onparticular exchanges. The records in the X-MASTER also contain a CSETfield in order to indicate limitations on international destinations. Inthe same manner as the access-level database, if the originatingexchange NPA-NXX contains “CSET32” in its CSET field and the term“CSET32” appears in the international database, the call will beblocked.

[0019] The CSET logic is the primary focus for the rest of thisapplication. With this in mind, the X-MASTER 162 and other databasesdiscussed here would likely be accessed for other purposes, such asviewing other flags and fields. For example, X-MASTER 162, like the BNS160 in step 310, is typically accessed to determine if there are otherblocking flags on the originating exchange. This step, and others, havebeen left out as extraneous to an understanding of Country Set logic andthe present invention.

[0020] Returning to the call processing procedure, in step 325, it isdetermined whether there is a CSET term in the particular NPA-NXX recordin X-MASTER 162. If there is, the CSET term is saved in step 327. Instep 327, if there was a previously stored accesss-level CSET, it isdeleted and replaced with the exchange-level CSET. This establishesgreater granularity, because the exchange-level is much narrower thanthe access-level. If either there is no CSET term in step 325, or afterthe CSET term is stored in step 327, the call processing continues atstep 330.

[0021] In step 330, the originating ANI is looked up in an ANI-leveldatabase, such as the ANI Property database (ANI PROP) 169. The ANI PROP169 contains records keyed to ANIs, and the records contain flags,fields, and other information unique to that ANI. This provides thegreatest granularity, because a particular payphone can be blocked usingan ANI-level database. There is also a CSET field in the ANI PROP 169records and, in step 335, it is determined whether there is a CSET termin the originating ANI's record in the ANI PROP 169. If there is, theCSET term is saved in step 337. In step 337, if there was a previouslystored access- or exchange-level CSET, it is deleted and replaced withthe ANI-level CSET.

[0022] Since the focus is on the CSET logic, if there is either no CSETterm in step 335, or after the CSET term is stored in step 337, theprocedure jumps to step 350 on FIG. 3B, leaving out many call processingdetails. In step 350, the destination number is checked against theInternational Country Code Database (INTERNAT'L COUNTRY) 164. TheINTERNAT'L COUNTRY has records keyed on the various internationalcountry codes and also includes flags that indicate various limitationson the particular countries. The records in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY alsocontain a field for Country Set Logic in order to indicate limitationson international destinations. In step 355, it is determined whetherthere is a matching CSET in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY. If there is amatching CSET in step 355, the call is blocked. If not, call processingcontinues until completion. During the continuation of call processing,other databases, including the International City Code (INTERNAT'L CITY)database 166, are accessed.

[0023] This method is effective in eliminating fraudulent calls madefrom origin points that have been recognized as generating a largeamount of fraudulent calls to particular international destinations.Typically, fraud control 100 maintains a fraud-to-revenue ratio inrelation to particular exchanges calling particular countries. Once thisfraud-to-revenue ratio reaches a certain threshold, some form of CSETlogic is placed on the originating exchange/destination countrycombination. This type of block makes sense because most hackers willmove from phone to phone within a certain area. Thus, the conventionalmethod eliminates a great deal of fraud; however, it is troublesome tolegitimate callers within that exchange. A calling card customer makinga non-fraudulent call within that exchange will be blocked from callingthat international destination. In addition, blocking the entire countrywill sometimes cast a much larger net than is needed for the task.

[0024] Therefore, there is a need to allow legitimate callers to makecalls from blocked exchanges to international destinations. In addition,there is a need to permit finer granularity in blocking calls tointernational destinations.

SUMMARY

[0025] One object of this invention is to provide a system and method ofallowing legitimate callers to make calls from areas blocked fromcalling certain international destinations in a telecommunicationsnetwork.

[0026] Another object of this invention is to provide a system and amethod for overriding fraud control blocks on exchanges or billingproducts from calling certain international destinations in atelecommunications network.

[0027] Yet another object of this invention is to provide a system and amethod for blocking billing products, exchanges, or ANIs from callingcertain international cities in a telecommunications network.

[0028] To accomplish the above and other objects, a system and methodfor preventing fraud on international special service calls in a longdistance telecommunication system is disclosed. In one aspect of thissystem and method, an override flag is created in the records of theBilling Number Screening (BNS) database so that selected customers canoverride fraud control blocks. When a call is made using a billingnumber whose corresponding record has the override flag set, the call isnot stopped by fraud control blocks on certain internationaldestinations. In another aspect of the system and method, internationaldestinations can be blocked with greater specificity because a CountrySet Logic (CSET) field is added to the International City Code Database.The addition of CSET to this database allows particular internationalcity destinations to be blocked from certain origin points.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

[0029] The foregoing and other objects, aspects and advantages will bebetter understood from the following detailed description of a preferredembodiment as illustrated in the following drawings. In the drawings,like reference numbers indicate identical or functionally similarelements.

[0030]FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a long distance telephone system,according to the prior art;

[0031]FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an exemplary and simplified callprocessing platform with associated fraud control system, according tothe prior art;

[0032]FIGS. 3A and 3B make up a flowchart of the CSET Logic callprocessing procedure, according to the prior art; and

[0033]FIGS. 4A and 4B make up a flowchart of a CSET Logic callprocessing procedure, according to the preferred embodiment of thepresent system and method.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0034] In the following description, the term “network” is a short-handdescription of the conglomeration of databases, trunk and telephonelines, routers, switches, protocols, and computers that are required tomake a telecommunications network.

[0035] In short, the preferred embodiment of the present system andmethod allows overrides of CSET Logic blocks and establishes greatergranularity for the international areas being blocked. In one aspect, anoverride flag is added to the BNS so that particular billing numberswill not be blocked by some of the CSET Logic. In another aspect, CSETlogic is added to an International City Code database already residentin the ISN platform.

[0036] An exemplary and simplified international special service callprocessing procedure according to the preferred embodiment of thepresent invention will be described with reference to FIG. 4A and 4B.The special service calls considered here all have a domesticorigination. As stated above, many steps that are required for callprocessing have been eliminated from the description as unnecessary forthe understanding of the preferred embodiment of the present invention.

[0037] In a similar manner to what was described above, the access codeis looked up in an access-level database, such as the AuthorizationProperty Database (AUTH PROP) 168, at step 400 in FIG. 4A. In step 405,it is determined whether there is an access-level CSET term in the AUTHPROP 168. If there is, the CSET term is saved in step 407. If eitherthere is no CSET term in step 405, or after the CSET term is stored instep 407, the billing number associated with the customer account islooked up in the BNS 160 at step 410. In step 415, it is determinedwhether the billing product is flagged for fraud. If the billing numberis flagged, the call will be re-routed or simply disconnected.

[0038] If the billing number is not flagged in step 415, it isdetermined whether an override flag is set in step 417. The overrideflag can be set either by a fraud analyst at the fraud control console100 or by an automated program at the fraud control console 100. Wheneither the fraud analyst or automated program determines that thebilling number is with a customer whose past security and accounthistory indicates a low risk for fraudulent behavior, they will set theoverride flag in the BNS 160. If it is determined that the override flagis set in step 417, any access-level CSET term that was saved in step407 is deleted in step 419. Then, the call processing procedure jumps tostep 430, where the originating ANI is looked up in the ANI PROP 169.This allows the low-risk customer to call either from blocked exchanges,or with a blocked access code or billing product, while still permittingfraud control 100 to block particular high-risk ANIs from making callsto certain international destinations. Although the procedure “jumps”over the X-MASTER look-up step to the ANI PROP look-up step 430, itshould be noted that that the X-MASTER 162 is typically still accessedduring call processing, just not for CSET logic. In addition, anotherembodiment of the present invention would allow a “super” flag thatwould also override the ANI-level CSET Logic. This means that there maybe CSET terms in some of the other databases, but they will be ignoredbecause of the customer's special classification.

[0039] If it is determined that the override flag is not set in step417, the exchange of the originating ANI is looked up in the X-MASTERdatabase 162 in step 420. In step 425, it is determined whether there isa CSET term in the X-MASTER 162. If there is one or more CSET terms, theCSET term(s) is saved in step 427. In step 427, if there was apreviously stored access-level CSET, it is deleted and replaced with theexchange-level CSET. If either there is no CSET term in step 425, orafter the CSET term is stored in step 427, the call processing continuesat step 430.

[0040] At step 430, the originating ANI is looked up in the ANI PROP169. After accessing the originating ANI record in the ANI PROP 169 instep 430, it is determined whether the originating ANI has one or moreCSET terms in step 435. If there is one or more CSET terms in step 435,the CSET term is saved in step 437. In step 437, if there was apreviously stored access-level or exchange-level CSET, it is deleted andreplaced with the ANI-level CSET. If either there is no CSET term instep 435, or after the CSET term is stored in step 437, the procedurejumps to step 450 in FIG. 4B. The destination number is looked up in theINTERNAT'L COUNTRY 164 at step 450. In step 455, it is determinedwhether there is a matching CSET in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY. If there isa matching CSET in step 455, the call is blocked.

[0041] If there is no matching CSET in step 455, call processingcontinues at step 460, where the destination number is looked up in theInternational City Code Database (INTERNAT'L CITY) 166. The INTERNAT'LCITY 166 has records keyed on the various international city codes andalso includes flags that indicate various limitations on the particularinternational cities. In the preferred embodiment of the presentinvention, the records in the INTERNAT'L CITY 166 also contain a fieldfor Country Set Logic in order to indicate limitations on internationalcities. In the preferred embodiment, the INTERNAT'L CITY 166 is alwaysaccessed for special service international calls, so checking formatching CSET logic adds little processing time to the procedure. Instep 465, it is determined whether there is a matching CSET in theINTERNAT'L CITY 166. If there is a matching CSET in step 465, the callis blocked. If not, call processing is continued to completion.

[0042] The CSET Logic addition to the INTERNAT'L CITY 166 providesgreater granularity in blocking international destinations. It alsoprovides greater flexibility. For instance, the term “CSET978” might bein the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY 164 record for Afghanistan, and in theINTERNAT'L CITY 166 records for Beirut and Istanbul. Thus, anyinternational special service calls with that CSET logic would beblocked from those destinations. In another embodiment, the CSET Logicis applied to sequence numbers in the INTERNAT'L COUNTRY 164. Forexample, the United Kingdom may be Country Code 14 (CC14), and itsconstituent countries, England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, havesequence numbers, such as 1, 2, and 3, within CC14. Adding the CSETLogic to individual sequence numbers would also increase granularity,allowing Scotland to be blocked without blocking the rest of the UnitedKingdom.

[0043] As one skilled in the relevant art would recognize, many elementsof a telecommunications network have been left out in order not toobscure the invention in details unnecessary to the understanding of thepresent invention. In addition, although the above-described embodimentis the preferred embodiment, many modifications would be obvious to oneskilled in the art.

[0044] While the present invention has been described with respect to acertain preferred embodiment, it should be understood that the inventionis not limited to this particular embodiment, but, on the contrary, theinvention is intended to cover all modifications, equivalents, andalternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention asdefined by the appended claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for suppressing a fraud control block ina telecommunications system, comprising the steps of: a) maintaining atleast one record associated with a customer account; b) adding anoverride flag field to each of the at least one record; c) determiningif an override flag is set in a record of the at least one record, whensaid record is accessed during call processing of a call using acustomer account associated with said record: d) overriding one or morefraud control blocks on an exchange blocked from processing the call ifit is determined in step (c) that the override flag is set; and e) ifoverriding the one or more fraud control blocks, blocking the call basedon an originating number of the call.
 2. The method as recited in claim1, wherein the at least one record of step (a) is maintained in a BilledNumber Screening (BNS) database.
 3. The method as recited in claim 1,wherein the call in step (c) is a special service call.
 4. The method asrecited in claim 3, wherein the special service call is an internationalcall.
 5. A device for suppressing a fraud control block in atelecommunications system, comprising: a database for maintaining atleast one record associated with a customer account and having anoverride flag; means for determining if the override flag is set in arecord of the at least one record, when said record is accessed duringcall processing of a call using a customer account associated with saidrecord; means for overriding one or more fraud control blocks on anexchange blocked from processing the call if the determining meansdetermines that the override flag is set; and means for blocking thecall based on an originating number of the call, if the overriding meansoverrides the one or more fraud control blocks.
 6. The device as recitedin claim 5, wherein the database is a Billing Number Screening (BNS)database.
 7. The device as recited in claim 5, wherein the call is aspecial service call, and further wherein the means for determining andthe means for overriding comprises a call processing platform.
 8. Amethod of fraud control for a call from an originating number to aninternational destination, comprising: overriding a call block to theinternational destination applied at an exchange level of theoriginating number, based on an override flag associated with an accountof the caller; and blocking the call based on the originating number ifthe call block at the exchange level of the originating number isoverridden.